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Contestations over knowledge production  
or ideological bullying?:  
A response to Legassick on the workers  ʼmovement
JABULANI SITHOLE 
Historical Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus
The key characteristic of the vast amount of literature on the South African work-
ers  ʼmovement in the post-1973 period is the denial that the class and national 
struggles were closely intertwined. This denial is underpinned by a strong ʻanti-
nationalist current  ʼwhich dismisses the national liberation struggle as ʻpopulist 
and nationalist  ʼ and therefore antithetical to socialism. This article cautions 
against uncritical endorsement of these views. It argues that they are the work 
of partisan and intolerant commentators who have dominated the South African 
academy since the 1970s and who have a tendency to suppress all versions of 
labour history which highlight these linkages in favour of those which portray 
national liberation and socialism as antinomies. The article also points out that 
these commentators use history to mobilise support for their rigidly held ideolog-
ical positions and to wage current political struggles under the pretext of advanc-
ing objective academic arguments.
The previous edition of this journal, a Special Issue entitled ʻMaking histories  ʼ
which was co-edited by Ciraj Rassool and Leslie Witz, features an article by 
Martin Legassick. In this article, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovement 
in the 1970s: The South African Democracy Education Trust and post-apartheid 
patriotic historyʼ,1 Legassick accuses me, along with Bernard Magubane and 
Sifiso Ndlovu, of at least six serious (academic) crimes. The first is that we have 
succumbed to prevailing power relations rather than challenged them in our quest 
to uncover the history of the workers  ʼmovement during the 1970s. The second 
is that we have inflated the role of the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) in forging working-class unity during the 1970s. Here we are charged 
with having ʻinvented a totally false chronology for the process of trade union 
unity  ʼby transposing the debates of the 1980s into the 1970s.2 The third is that 
we have completely ʻfailed to grasp  ʼ the ʻtheory of permanent revolution which 
applies to all “Third World” countries  ʼand instead favoured the theory of colo-
nialism of a special type (CST), which advances the notion of the national demo-
cratic revolution as a required stage preceding a proletarian, socialist revolution.3 
1  M Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovement in the 1970s: The South African Democracy Education 
Trust and post-apartheid history  ʼin C. Rassool and L. Witz, ʻMaking historiesʼ, Special Issue, Kronos: Southern African 
Histories, 34, Nov. 2008: 240-266.
2  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 265. 
3  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 263. 
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The fourth is that we have either ignored or falsified evidence that contradicts our 
desperate bid to produce accounts which feed into the ruling partyʼs mythology 
in order to enhance our ʻunspecified  ʼcareers.4 The fifth is that we contested their 
views on the workers  ʼmovement because it raised issues of the political indepen-
dence of the working class from nationalist orthodoxy.5 The sixth is that Ndlovu 
and I have consequently taken an ahistorical step backwards which ignores the 
evidence and work of previous historians.6 
Magubane, Ndlovu and I are therefore portrayed as post-apartheid rightwing 
mavericks – sundry peddlers of ʻpatriotic history  ʼ who have sheepishly bowed 
to pressure from the ANC leadership of the 2000s in our anxious bid to act as its 
ʻorganic intellectualsʼ.7 The article suggests to me that Legassick is mobilising 
the academic community to find us guilty as charged. Fortunately for Magubane, 
as a retired professor he has nothing to lose. 
Legassick is, of course, most welcome to write a critique of the South 
African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) project. It is his approach to this 
task that is unfortunate. Instead of attempting to provide a balanced assessment 
of the projectʼs aims and objectives, its challenges, weaknesses and accomplish-
ments, he has seemingly chosen to organise an anti-SADET campaign. The 
intense hostility towards SADET in his article comes as no surprise. I once asked 
him why he had got involved in the project in the first place if he harboured such 
negative feelings towards the members of its Board of Trustees. His answer was 
that he had his own political agenda.8 
This is indeed the essence of my argument in this article, elaborated most 
explicitly in the concluding section. The article begins by explaining the long his-
tory of Legassickʼs hostility to our work on the project. It shows that Ndlovu and 
I fell out of favour with him years before we produced the allegedly ʻuseless draft 
chapter  ʼwhich he mentions in his paper.9 I then attempt to provide an overview 
of SACTU activities in southern Africa and beyond during the 1970s and 1980s 
in order to support and document our arguments about the history of SACTU. 
I then briefly mention the activities of the key, London-based SACTU Internal 
Committee, formed in 1984, which carried out very similar work to that in the 
Frontline States from 1984 to 1990.10 I have devoted a few pages to an examina-
tion of the role of SACTU in the trade union unity talks which preceded the for-
mation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985. I end 
the article with a brief discussion of why I think Legassick attacks us. 
4  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 257-8, 260-1.
5  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 241.
6  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 266.
7  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 266.
8  Authorʼs informal discussion with Martin Legassick after a SADET authors  ʼmeeting (attended by Barry Feinberg), SADET 
Ofﬁces, Nedbank Building, Corner of Andries and Church Streets, Pretoria, 2001. 
9  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 251-254.
10  I elaborate on the activities of the latter in volume four of the SADET project. See J. Sithole, ʻThe South African Congress 
of Trade Unions and labour struggles in the 1980sʼ, SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 4: 1980-
1990 (Pretoria: UNISA Press, forthcoming [2010]): chapter 18.
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The origins of the conflict with Legassick
In order to understand the tone and arguments of Legassickʼs article, it is neces-
sary to go back some five or six years. I was drawn into the SADET project at a 
meeting held at John Danielʼs office at the then University of Durban-Westville 
some time in 2001. From the outset, I submitted proposals of what I intended to 
contribute to each volume as they were being planned. There was never a time 
when I was told what to research or what to write about. I chose to contribute a 
chapter on the transition to the ANC underground and armed struggles for vol-
ume one of The Road to Democracy in South Africa because I had access to many 
KwaZulu-Natal-based veterans of the ANC, SACTU and Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(MK). I became one of the authors of the chapter on the Wankie and Sipolilo 
campaigns through sheer luck: I was asked to read and make editorial comments 
on Moses Ralinalaʼs chapter because I had conducted interviews with two veter-
ans of the Wankie operation, Cletus Mzimela and Justice Gizenga Mpanza. I con-
tributed more than twenty pages of new material to the chapter and subsequently 
received a phone call from Bernard Magubane, the project leader, inviting me to 
become the second author of the chapter. 
I had initially proposed to contribute two chapters to volume two. The first 
was to be on the ANC underground in Natal during the 1970s, the second on 
the formation of the KwaZulu bantustan during the same decade. I spent sev-
eral weeks at the ANC Archives at the University of Fort Hare, at the Mayibuye 
Centre at the University of the Western Cape and in the William Cullen Library 
at the University of the Witwatersrand. This rekindled my long-standing inter-
est in labour history. When I enrolled for an Honours degree in History at the 
University of Natal in the early 1990s I had intended to conduct research on the 
1973 Durban strikes. My interest in labour history stemmed partly from the fact 
that I had been a factory worker in Pinetown for two years after matriculating 
in 1980. It was Dr Tim Nuttall who persuaded me to choose a different research 
topic. 
One of the stories which fascinated me in the files at the Mayibuye Centre 
was that dealing with SACTUʼs conflicts with Rob Petersen, Martin Legassick, 
Paula Ensor, David Hemson and Peter Collins. These conflicts led to their sus-
pension from the ANC and their eventual expulsion in 1985. I subsequently 
organised interviews with Legassick, Ensor and Petersen to explore this history. 
I conducted interviews with them during the first week of September 2003. Late 
the following year I submitted a proposal to write a chapter on SACTU for vol-
ume two and invited Sifiso Ndlovu, who at the time served as the main SADET 
researcher, to co-author it with me. Sifiso had already acquired a wealth of archi-
val material. As was often the case, chapter proposals were circulated among the 
participants in the SADET project. 
This proposal set me on an unexpected collision course with Legassick. 
SADET convened a meeting of participants at its offices in Pretoria to dis-
cuss draft chapters for volume two. During the trip from O.R. Tambo Airport 
to Pretoria on the Friday before our meeting, I encountered a very combative 
Martin Legassick who demanded to know why I wanted to contribute a chapter 
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on SACTU because, he alleged, it had never done anything for the South African 
working class. My trip that evening became a complete nightmare. I turned to 
Lungisile Ntsebeza who was sitting next to me in the hired Volkswagen kombi, 
which Legassick was driving, for an explanation of what I had done wrong. If 
my memory serves me, Ntsebeza said: ʻWell, you have stepped into an ideo-
logical minefield.  ʼThis set the tone for the hostile attitude that is still event in 
Legassickʼs article published five years later. 
It is not true that we later made changes to our chapter in response to 
Legassickʼs comments, or because Magubane or other Board Members pres-
surised us into doing so. I hold no brief for the ANC, SACP or SACTU, as 
Legassick insinuates. I suspect he is furious because we differed with his own 
interpretation of why he and his colleagues were suspended and expelled from 
the ANC. Unfortunately, we stand by our view. 
Legassick also insinuates that Ndlovu and I sided with Magubane during 
their disagreements over the history of the independent trade unions. For the 
record, I never participated in their furious exchanges because I did not want 
to involve myself in conflicts between life-long friends. I chose not to respond 
to Legassickʼs many angry attacks over the phone or via e-mail which he con-
sistently copied to hundreds of university-based recipients within South Africa 
and internationally before and after the publication of volume two. He knows 
very well that I stayed out of the earlier frictions involving Magubane and Philip 
Bonner during the editing of volume one. Apparently this did not please him 
either. He accused me of being too loyal and respectful for refusing to take sides 
in the series of disagreements which threatened to derail the editing of the first 
SADET volume. I will now turn to an overview of the SACTU activities in order 
to be able to talk to some of the issues that Legassick has raised in his article.
The regrouping and reorganisation of SACTU in exile, 1969–83
Sifiso Ndlovu and I state unequivocally that SACTU had no organisational 
presence in southern Africa until 1969 when its leaders and activists regrouped 
and reorganised themselves. Its leaders initially met as trade unionists at two 
meetings in March and May of 1969.11 The first was held in Lusaka, Zambia, 
on 2 March 1969. The second took place in between the various sessions of the 
Morogoro Conference in Tanzania on 2 May 1969.12 The Morogoro meeting took 
two landmark decisions aimed at streamlining and formalising SACTU activities 
abroad. The first was to set up its provisional headquarters in Lusaka in Zambia 
and the second was to appoint its headquarters  ʼcommittee consisting of Milton 
ʻMemory  ʼ Miya and seventeen others. It appointed Mark Shope as its General 
Secretary and Eric Mtshali, Alven Bennie and Archie Sibeko as its other full-
11  J. Sithole and S. Ndlovu, ʻThe Revival of the Labour Movement, 1970-1980ʼ, in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South 
Africa, Volume 2 (1970-1980) (Pretoria: UNISA, 2006): 212.
12  SADET, Mark Williams Shope (MWS) Papers, Letter from Mark Shope to the London Committee of SACTU, 9 March 
1970; and Report to SACTU NEC Meeting, Lusaka, Zambia, 25-27 October 1974: 1. 
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time functionaries.13 Mtshali was appointed Administrative Secretary and Alven 
Bennie as Secretary for International Affairs.14 
SACTU established an Internal Committee and charged it with the respon-
sibility to explore ways and means of re-establishing contacts in various factories 
within the country. It targeted SACTU stalwarts, trade unionists and ordinary 
workers. There is evidence of communication between Johannesburg-based trade 
unionists, among them Richard Takalo and Miriam Sithole, and the newly estab-
lished SACTU headquarters in Lusaka as early as March 1973.15 Takalo, who in 
the 1950s and 1960s was a trade unionist in both the metal and mining industries, 
was in touch with both Shope and Gilbert Hlalukana, whom he had replaced 
as the Transvaal Secretary of the Metal Workers  ʼ Union when Hlalukana was 
banned in 1961. In a reply to Shopeʼs letter dated 6 March 1973, Takalo voiced 
the opinion that although SACTU itself was never banned, the state was bent 
on banning its leaders. He said of the SACTU organisations: ʻIn my view these 
organisations are not dead but have taken one step backward and there is nothing 
to stop them to take two steps forward.ʼ16  
Miriam Sitholeʼs letter to Shope, dated 28 April 1973, reveals that she and 
Takalo belonged to the same SACTU underground unit in the Transvaal. Their 
line of communication was mainly through Botswana, where a Francistown-
based person, Tsela Mangonye, served as the key contact. In this letter, written 
from Mangonyeʼs place in Botswana where she had travelled in the hope of meet-
ing Shope, she informed him that workers were demanding that SACTU re-open 
offices in Johannesburg.17 Sithole appealed to Shope to arrange for someone from 
their unit to travel to Lusaka to discuss the establishment of the SACTU under-
ground in the Transvaal with its leadership. She and Richard Takalo had worked 
out safer means of communication in order to prevent the security police from 
intercepting their correspondence.18 
The SACTU leaders were fully aware that it was struggling to establish a 
foothold within the country for most of the 1970s. For instance, they highlighted 
two problem areas in their report to the extended National Executive Committee 
(NEC) meeting of the ANC in March 1975. The first was that workers were not 
prepared to discuss anything which mentioned SACTU for fear of victimisation 
by employers and the security police. In areas where this fear was prevalent no 
one was prepared to work for the resurrection of SACTU structures. The second 
was that in other parts of the country former SACTU officials had intimated that 
the best thing to do would be for former SACTU activists to join the affiliates of 
the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA). The report added that the 
13  SADET, MWS Papers, Letter from Mark Shope to the London Ofﬁce of SACTU, 9 March 1970; and Interview with Alven 
Bennie, conducted by Jabulani Sithole, Port Elizabeth, 7 February 2005, SADET Oral History Project (OHP).  
14  University of Fort Hare (UFH), ANC Lusaka Mission, Box 134, Folder 289, Letter from Moses Mabhida to Alfred Nzo, 29 
July 1975; Interview with Eric Mtshali, conducted by Jabulani Sithole, Clermont, 11 and 24 October 2001, SADET OHP; 
Sithole and Ndlovu, ʻThe Revival of the Labour Movement, 1970-1980ʼ: 212-3.  
15  Sithole and Ndlovu, ʻThe Revival of the Labour Movementʼ: 217-8. 
16  SADET, MWS Papers, Handwritten letter from Richard Takalo to Mark Shope, undated. 
17  SADET, MWS Papers, Handwritten letter from Miriam Sithole to Mark Shope, 28 April 1973. 
18  SADET, MWS Papers, Handwritten letter from Miriam Sithole to Mark Shope, 28 April 1973. 
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situation was made worse by the fact that SACTU underground operatives were 
very few and were thinly spread on the ground within the country.19 SACTU 
tried to rectify the situation by setting up front unions and by infiltrating various 
trade unions. The former was easily accomplished when SACTU began to set 
up front unions from 1978 onwards. The latter remained a great challenge until 
the early 1980s. As a result of this the Federation of South African Trade Unions 
(FOSATU) remained largely insulated from SACTU and its allies in the ANC, 
SACP and internally based Congress-aligned organisations.20  
In a letter to Ray (Alexander) Simons, dated 30 June 1978, Moses Mabhida 
had also revealed that the SACTU presence within the country remained lim-
ited and that its influence within FOSATU was non-existent. However, he said 
that he hoped to facilitate its infiltration through a prominent Natal-based trade 
unionist and a member of the Metal and Allied Workers  ʼ Union (MAWU), a 
FOSATU affiliate named Alpheus Mthethwa, with whom he was holding discus-
sions to persuade him to serve as a SACTU underground operative.21 Simons also 
reported that she was negotiating with someone named June in November 1978.22 
I am not suggesting that Mthethwa and June were members of the SACTU 
underground as I could not find any evidence to confirm or dispute this in the 
documents in the Simons Collection. At its January 1979 NEC meeting SACTU 
adopted resolutions which encouraged the infiltration of FOSATU and other 
existing trade unions in order to spread and entrench its influence.23 
Ndlovu and I have never denied that the front unions were first formed 
towards the end of the 1970s, but we maintain that their formation did not 
mark the beginnings of the SACTU underground but rather the beginnings of 
SACTUʼs organisational influence within the country. Legassick conflates the 
successes and failures of the front unions with SACTUʼs overall work within the 
labour movement.24 If we assess the strengths and weaknesses of the front unions 
separately from SACTUʼs overall objectives and plans, we can see that its leaders 
were quick to acknowledge that their initial efforts to organise within the country 
yielded disappointing results. It was in recognition of these weaknesses that they 
resolved to consolidate their administrative and operational headquarters and 
coordinate activities within southern Africa in the late 1970s.25 This explanation 
is not intended to fudge the position Ndlovu and I took on the establishment of 
the SACTU underground, but rather to emphasise that we should not conflate 
issues which should be treated separately for the sake of political expediency. 
Furthermore, to acknowledge the weaknesses of the SACTU underground struc-
tures is not the same as denying their existence. Weak underground structures 
19  University of Cape Town, Archives and Manuscripts Department, BC1081 Simons Collection [hereafter BC1081], 
4.4.15.3.1, Report on internal work of SACTU to the extended NEC meeting of the ANC, Morogoro, Tanzania, March 
1975. 
20  FOSATU was founded at a congress held at Hammanskraal, 14-15 April 1979. See BC1081, 4.4.15.18, Federale Nederlandse 
Vakbeweging (FNV) Project, 1980.  
21  BC1081, 4.4.15.9.1/6, Letter from Moses Mabhida to Ray Simons, 30 June 1978. 
22  BC1081, 4.4.15.9.1/6, Letter from Ray Simons to M. Mabhida, 16 November 1978. 
23  BC1081, 4.4.15.6, Minutes of  Internal Committee, Lusaka, 20 July 1979.   
24  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 253-258 
25  For more on this, see J. Sithole, ʻThe South African Congress of Trade Unionsʼ: chapter 18. 
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existed for several years in the Transvaal, Eastern Cape and Natal before the for-
mation of the front unions.26
I do not think that Miriam Sithole, Richard Takalo and Mark Shope con-
spired to leave Shopeʼs papers in Gertrude Shopeʼs garage for Sifiso Ndlovu and 
me to ʻdiscover  ʼ and utilise in our latest portfolios as ʻANC spin-doctorsʼ, as 
Legassick suggests.27 Let me add that I came to know of these papers during an 
interview with Phiwayinkosi ʻNkosinathi  ʼNhleko, a former SACTU underground 
operative who had worked closely with Mark Shope when SACTU recruited him 
into the underground in the mid-1980s. Nhleko was told of the papers by Getrude 
Shope, after Mark Shopeʼs death. I then informed the SADET offices in Pretoria 
and they sent Sifiso Ndlovu to see the papers.28 By the way, Nhleko was an active 
member of the Transport and General Workers  ʼUnion (TGWU). He was elected 
its General Secretary in 1989.29
I was not aware that the Jack and Ray Simons papers were housed in the 
Manuscript and Archives Department at the University of Cape Town when 
Sifiso Ndlovu and I wrote our chapter for volume two of the SADET project. We 
consequently relied heavily on sources from the Mayibuye Centre at UWC, the 
ANC Archives at the University of Fort Hare and Mark Shopeʼs collection. It was 
footnote 16 in the chapter by David Hemson, Martin Legassick and Nicole Ulrich 
which gave me an indication of their existence at UCT.30 I noted with interest 
that there were 23 other references to sources housed in the same archives and 
yet there was no mention of the SACTU documents in the Simons Collection. 
When I paid a month-long research visit to UCT, I discovered that Legassick had 
in fact looked at the documents. Seemingly, he decided to ignore them because 
they yield evidence which contradicts his rigidly held ideological position on the 
workers  ʼmovement in general and on SACTU activities in particular. I therefore 
find it ridiculous that Legassick should cast aspersions on our use of historical 
evidence when the opposite seems to be true.31 Using these sources, I have been 
able to reconstruct an alternative account of SACTU activities in the 1970s and 
1980s which will probably cause more discomfort to Legassick. 
The SACTU Internal Committee and underground activities in the 1980s
Since its formation in 1973 SACTU had always treated its Internal Committee 
(SIC) as one of its premier committees. This Committee coordinated the activi-
ties of several regional SICs that were based in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Although the SIC remained active during the 1970s, 
26  Interview with Thobile Mhlahlo, conducted by Jabulani Sithole, Port Elizabeth, 6 February 2005, SADET Oral History 
Project (OHP); Interview with Humphrey Maxegwana, conducted by Jabulani Sithole, Port Elizabeth, 7 February 2005, 
SADET OHP.  
27  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 261.
28  Interview with Phiwayinkosi Nkosinathi Nhleko. conducted by Jabulani Sithole, Pietermaritzburg, 1 August 2003, SADET 
OHP. 
29  South African Labour Bulletin (SALB) 14, 6 (February 1990): 84-85; Interview with Nkosinathi Nhleko. 
30  D. Hemson, M. Legassick and N. Ulrich, ʻWhite activists and the revival of the workers  ʼmovement  ʼin SADET, The Road 
to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 (1970-1980) (Pretoria: UNISA, 2006): 248.
31  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 257-8, 260-1.
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it was unable to make much impact on the trade unions which were emerging 
within the country in the wake of the 1973 black workers  ʼstrikes. As I indicated 
earlier, the SACTU vice-president, Moses Mabhida, was the first of its leaders to 
acknowledge this in his correspondence with Ray Simons in June 1978.32 I dem-
onstrate elsewhere that by April 1984 SACTU had established another SIC unit 
in London which was responsible for the whole of Western Europe.33 Its work 
was no different from that of others. It met trade unionists from South Africa, 
conducted trade union education and training, set up SACTU underground 
units within trade unions inside the country and mobilised aboveground sup-
port from trade unions for specific unions. It was headed by Archie Sibeko and 
also accounted to the SIC HQ in Lusaka. Initially, it reported to Mhleli Mgwayi 
(nom de guerre Mlungisi Gazi Bazani), a member of the Revolutionary Council. 
Thereafter it reported to Martin Sere. Mark Sweet and Xolile Majeke, during 
his stay in London, coordinated its activities. It set up numerous SACTU under-
ground units within the country between 1984 and early 1990. During the six 
years of its existence this SIC unit submitted over 300 reports to SIC HQ on ten 
COSATU affiliates.34 
At its January 1979 NEC meeting, SACTU ordered its SIC to gather infor-
mation on the MAWU, the South African Railway and Harbour Workers  ʼUnion 
(SARHWU), the Agricultural Workers  ʼUnion (AWU) and the Transport Workers  ʼ
Union. It was asked to analyse this information under the following headings: 
their strength in 1979; the scope of their activities; their politics, leadership and 
state of political consciousness; the contacts that SACTU had in these organisa-
tions and among the workers in these sectors of the economy; and the prospects 
of developing further contacts where they existed, or starting new ones where 
none existed. It had to determine and advise the NEC whether such contacts or 
organisations could form a base for planning large-scale SACTU-led organisa-
tional activities. It also resolved to infiltrate the largest of the newly formed trade 
union federations, FOSATU.35       
The SACTU leaders were the first to acknowledge that the unionʼs influence 
within the countryʼs labour movement was still limited by the early 1980s. Ray 
Simons attributed this failure to establish a meaningful presence within the coun-
tryʼs labour movement to two inherent weaknesses within the newly created front 
unions. The first was their tendency to form general workers  ʼ unions.36 These 
general unions placed more power and influence in the hands of officials rather 
than the industrial unions, which allowed for greater worker control. The second 
tendency was regionalism and unhealthy competition for members. The front 
unions competed for workers with one another. Ray Simons said their approach 
32  BC1081, 4.4.15.9.1/6, Letter from M. Mabhida to Ray Simons, 30 June 1978.
33  Sithole, ʻThe South African Congress of Trade Unionsʼ: chapter 18. 
34  Sithole, ʻThe South African Congress of Trade Unionsʼ: chapter 18 and telephonic conversation between Jabulani Sithole 
and Mark Sweet, 10 November 2009.
35  BC1081, 4.4.15.3.4, Resolutions of SACTU NEC meeting in Dar es Salaamʼ, January 1979.
36  These included the South African Allied Workers  ʼUnion (SAAWU) in Natal and Eastern Cape, the General Allied Workers  ʼ
Union (GAWU) in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) industrial area, the National Federation of Workers 
(NFW) and the National Iron, Steel, Metal and Allied Workers  ʼUnion (NISMAWU) in Natal and the Western Province 
General Workers  ʼUnion (WPGWU) in the Western Province.
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stood in sharp contradiction to SACTU policy to form industrial unions. She 
dismissed arguments that workers were not ready as cheap excuses by those who 
were opposed to industrial unions because they would ensure worker control and 
erode ʻprivate  ʼpower bases.37 
SACTU had abandoned the idea of forming front unions in the light of the 
aforementioned weaknesses. Its leadership consistently discouraged workers from 
breaking away from the existing trade unions if they were unhappy. Instead, it 
encouraged them to challenge the leadership and radicalise existing trade unions 
from within. By then, SACTU had begun to place more emphasis on infiltration 
and the takeover of existing trade unions rather than to set up rival breakaway 
labour structures. 
The primacy of infiltration necessitated the development of a comprehen-
sive plan for entering the labour movement. The SIC therefore organised its work 
around three key initiatives. They were infiltration, underground organisation and 
intelligence. In terms of these, SACTU cadres were infiltrated into the existing 
registered and unregistered trade unions and the state-created organs of worker 
control such as the Works, Liaison and Enterprise Committees. The objective was 
to influence policies and shift them towards the goals of socialist democracy and 
national liberation in the case of trade unions, whereas in the case of the Works, 
Liaison and Enterprise Committees the main objective was to sabotage them from 
within or to revitalise them in a direction away from their repressive designs.  
The SICs were responsible for setting up an effective clandestine machin-
ery through which workers could be organised and educated and through which 
information and propaganda material could be distributed. Underground activi-
ties necessitated considerable logistical back-up in the form of courier networks, 
funding of organisers, finding of safe houses, etc. The last major focus was intel-
ligence, which entailed the collection of vital information from inside the country. 
Intelligence gathered could assume three forms. The first was the union or labour 
information relating to existing trade unions which could be used both in external 
campaigns and for the effective infiltration of existing labour organisations. The 
second was information on working conditions which included, among other 
things, the general nature of repressive legislation and labour disputes which 
could be used by internally based cadres of SACTU as well as the broader lib-
eration movement for external campaigns internationally. The third was strategic 
information on armaments production, new industrial developments and foreign 
assistance to the apartheid regime.38 In this respect the aim was to provide sup-
port to MK operatives involved in acts of sabotage. 
The SACTU Internal Committees worked through trade union cells of 
one or more people each. These cells were made up of workers or cadres who 
held strategic positions within their trade unions and who were in a position to 
37  BC1081, 4.4.15.6, Ray Simons  ʼnotes made at meeting with an underground operative ʻPʼ, 2 June 1981; Moses Ndlovu 
conﬁrmed that SAAWU ofﬁcials raised irrelevant questions. Interview with Moses Ndlovu, conducted by Jabulani Sithole, 
Ashdown, 12 September 2001, SADET OHP; Interview with Samuel Kikine, conducted by Jabulani Sithole, Durban, 4 
October 2001, SADET OHP. 
38  BC1081, 4.4.15.6, Internal Organisation of SACTU, undated. 
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guide their unions, pass on information to them, and identify possible recruits. 
Similarly, the Works, Liaison and Enterprise Committees were infiltrated through 
cells made up of one or more people who held influential positions so that they 
too could give guidance and influence the work of these committees from within. 
These underground operatives were expected to pass on information about the rel-
evant committees, and identify and pass on information about potential recruits. 
The organisational or education cell was often made up of a small number of cad-
res to organise underground work and to conduct detailed educational activities 
on organisations and the struggle. Propaganda cells were also made up of very 
small units. These units were responsible for disseminating propaganda by means 
of pamphlet bombs, pamphlet dumps, wall slogans, etc., which the Department 
of Information and Publicity (DIP) researched and produced. Logistical cells 
were often made up of one person who was responsible for providing courier ser-
vices, safe houses and funds. These cells served as links between the external and 
internal cells. The intelligence cells were preferably made up of one person each. 
They had the special task of infiltrating particular factories or industries to gather 
and supply regular information on them. 
I am making these points because evidence at my disposal demonstrates that 
the SACTU leadership never indulged in idealist positions of boycotting struc-
tures with workers. It encouraged its underground operatives to infiltrate them 
with the aim of undermining them from within if they were regarded as reaction-
ary, or in order to take them over if they were deemed progressive. This renders 
Legassickʼs arguments about the question of collaboration and non-collaboration 
irrelevant.39 
The SIC had established large networks of Internal Committees. These oper-
ated from Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which 
supplied regular reports and held regular discussions with their handlers in these 
front areas. The Botswana network was responsible for the Transvaal and parts 
of the Northern Cape and North West; the Lesotho SIC operated in the Eastern 
Cape, Western Cape and Natal; the Swaziland and Mozambican networks were 
responsible for the eastern Transvaal, especially Witbank, and various parts of 
Natal.40 These Internal Committees held regular consultations and discussions 
with ordinary worker activists and members of the SACTU underground who 
were working in factories within the country. 
 The Swaziland SIC was under the leadership of Johannes ʻJoe  ʼMkhwanazi 
as the Chairperson, Jabu Nyawose as the Secretary, Nhlanhla as the Deputy 
Secretary, and John Nkadimeng as the Treasurer towards the end of 1979.41 
The Botswana SIC consisted of Dan Tloome, Marius Schoon, Jeanette Schoon 
and John Pule in the late 1970s. The SIC leadership in Lusaka recommended 
that Mduduzeli Sibanyoni and Alpheus should join the Botswana SIC in order 
to reinforce it in 1979. Bernard Molewa, Gadfly, Stephen, Janet and Isaac had 
39  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 247-8.
40  BC1081, 4.4.15.6, ʻExternal Organisation of SACTUʼ, undated. 
41  BC1081, 4.4.15.7.3, ʻMinutes of the SACTU Internal Committee meeting held in Lusakaʼ, 20 September 1979; Interview 
with Kikine. 
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been drawn into it by the end of April 1981.42 William Khanyile, Agnes Gumede 
and Mduduzele were some of the prominent members of the Maputo SIC.43 The 
Lesotho SIC was up and running in the late 1970s and had grown from strength 
to strength by the early 1980s. It persuaded workers who were dissatisfied with 
the United Automobile Workers (UAW) to try to radicalise the union from within 
rather than break away from it. They insisted that continual breakaways from the 
existing unions would weaken the labour movement.44 
An underground operative identified only as ʻP  ʼprovided a detailed report of 
the activities of his underground network in a meeting with Ray Simons in June 
1981. He told Simons that in his working committee of six members, each mem-
ber was responsible for organising specific industrial unions. Its members were 
PD, TB, Gene Gugushe (alias Titus), Sidney (Mavimbela), Slumber Jayiya and 
Mlungisi ʻGazi  ʼBazani. ʻP  ʼwas responsible for the railway workers, stevedores, 
transport and municipal workers, and TB was responsible for the motor indus-
try. Every member of his working committee was a convener of an underground 
cell of three people each.45 The Lesotho SIC had recruited reliable and very 
active workers and trade unionists. They were Boy Jacob at Wilson Rowntree, 
Bangumzi Sifingo at Chloride, Mphakathi September, Pamastone and Humphrey 
(Maxegwana). Sifingo worked as a SAAWU organiser and Maxegwana worked 
with Rufus Rwexu and Bangumzi Sifingo.46 
There was regular contact between the Lesotho SIC and its underground 
operatives in Dimbaza throughout 1981.47 For example, underground cadres 
who operated through unnamed unions in Dimbaza as well as the GAWU-linked 
operatives paid several visits to Lesotho for consultations during the course of 
the year.48 These operatives were advised to work clandestinely in order to avoid 
alienating workers who were afraid of being associated with SACTU.49 Similarly 
two senior Lesotho-based SACTU NEC members, Simon Makhetha and Mlungisi 
ʻGazi  ʼ Bazani, spent several weeks at a time in Port Elizabeth, Dimbaza, 
Keiskammahoek, Bedford, Adelaide and Grahamstown doing underground work 
in 1981. The Lesotho SIC had made inroads into various parts of the Ciskei such 
as Zwelitsha, Dimbaza, King Williams Town, Alice and beyond by 1982. This 
machinery was organising in Cradock, Matatiele, Engcobo, Gumakala, Emgwali, 
42  BC1081, 4.4.15.7.1, ʻReport of the Botswana SICʼ, 25 April 1981. Please note that no last names of these SACTU members 
were given in the records.
43  BC1081, 4.4.15.6, Minutes of Internal Committee meeting, Lusaka, 20 September 1979; and see BC1081, 4.4.15.15.43, 
ʻLetter from Ray Simons to SACTU Internal Committee, Maputoʼ, 12 October 1979; ʻLetter from Eli Weinberg to William 
Khanyile, 15 May 1980; ʻLetter from Ray Simons to William Khanyileʼ, 17 May 1980; ʻLetter from Eli Weinberg to 
William Khanyileʼ, 13 July 1980; ʻLetter from Eli Weinberg to Agnes Gumedeʼ, 15 November 1980; Interview with 
Mhlahlo; Interview with Maxegwana. 
44  BC1081, 4.4.15.7.5, Report on activities of the Lesotho Internal Committee, January to December 1980; Interview with 
Maxegwana; Interview with Mhlahlo; Interview with Mark Sweet, conducted by Jabulani Sithole, Cape Town, 9 January 
2005, SADET OHP. 
45  BC1081, 4.4.15.7.1, Notes Ray Simons  ʼmeeting with ʻPʼ, 2 June 1981.
46  University of the Western Cape, Mayibuye Centre, ANC Lusaka Papers, (MCH02), Box 65, Janet Love, ʻPresent Labour 
Situation in South Africaʼ, a discussion paper presented on the 25th Anniversary of SACTU, 5 March 1981; Interview with 
Maxegwana.  
47  University of Fort Hare, ANC SOMAFCO, Directorʼs Ofﬁce, Box 54, Folders 5 and 6, Summary of Work Done in 1981, 21 
December 1981. 
48  BC1081, 4.4.15.7.5, ʻReport submitted to comrade SSʼ, 3 December 1981: 3-4.
49  BC1081, Report from Comrade Rwentela, August 1982. 
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East London, Port Elizabeth and Cradock by August 1982. Themba Nxumalo of 
the NFW, a Durban-based front union, worked with the Lesotho SIC. 
The Swaziland SIC worked with GAWU in the Transvaal, which was 
formed at the end of 1980 when Mary Ntsike and Rita Ndzanga led a split 
from BAWU. Longstanding SACTU underground operatives Samson Ndou, 
Ephraim Shabangu, Samuel Pholoto and Sydney Mufamadi joined GAWU. Sipho 
Kubheka, Robert Manci and Kgalema Motlanthe were also part of the SACTU 
underground in the Transvaal.50 I was unable to establish how the Maputo SIC 
operated. The SICs operating in the forward areas received and scrutinised 
reports regularly and passed them on to the SIC HQ in Lusaka, which in turn 
reported to the SACTU NEC. Internally based SACTU operatives, using their 
noms de guerre, began to submit reports to their counsellors in the forward areas 
regularly from the late 1970s onwards.51 The SIC headquarters in Lusaka contin-
ued to receive and discuss reports of SACTU underground activities within the 
country until 1990. It met representatives of various trade union formations to 
discuss trade union work, challenges and obstacles before and after the forma-
tion of COSATU in November 1985.52 It submitted regular reports to the SACTU 
NEC meetings during this period.53 
Ndlovu and I argued that the Lusaka HQ was given a new lease of life when 
a group of young SACTU activists, Mark Sweet, Thobile Mhlahlo and Humphrey 
Maxegwana, were deployed to serve on it. Sweet, from Cape Town, had left the 
country via Botswana in 1980. He remained active in SACTU structures and was 
drawn into SIC in the mid-1980s. Mhlahlo, who was from Port Elizabeth, was 
instructed to leave the country via Lesotho in 1985. He was drawn into the SIC 
shortly thereafter. Maxegwana from East London also left the country in April 
1985, and he too was integrated into the SIC headquarters soon after his arrival in 
Lusaka.54 None of these operatives were removed from their posts as trade union 
operatives, as Legassick suggests.55 They may have received military training at 
one point or another during their time as underground operatives, but this was to 
enable them to provide defence to workers who were already on the receiving 
end of attacks from the regime and its vigilantes by the 1980s.
SACTU placed great value on trade union education as one of the means 
of spreading its influence or of establishing some presence in the various trade 
unions. The August 1983 SACTU NEC meeting took a decision to establish an 
education programme under the auspices of its Education Department (SED) to 
complement the work of its Internal Committee. Its primary task was to identify 
lecturers within its ranks who could develop a syllabus and provide lectures to 
50  See interview with Robert Manci conducted by Siﬁso Ndlovu, 8 March and 14 June 2001, SADET OHP; and interview with 
Sipho Kubheka, conducted by Snuki Zikalala, SALB, 17, 4 (July/August 1993): 87-88.  
51  See, for example,  BC1081, 4.4.15.18, ʻReports submitted by ʻMorogoro  ʼʻhandwritten report on trade unions at homeʼ, 22 
July 1976; ʻMpho  ʼ on ʻthe Federation of South African Trade Unionsʼ, 7 January 1978;  Mphoʼs assessment of reports by 
ʻAppleʼ, February 1979; ʻTheodoreʼ, February 1979; ʻPeter Bakvisʼ, February 1979; and ʻJojoʼ, February 1979.    
52  BC1081, 4.4.15.7.5, Notes on meeting held in Harare on 26 October 1985; and Notes on meeting held to dissect trade unions 
in the Western Cape attended by J.N., R.Z., Nick Henwood, Brian Williams, Zinzile and Johnson Mpukumpa, 15 March 
1988. 
53  BC1081, Minutes of the SACTU Internal Committee, Roma, Lesotho, 7 December 1988. 
54  Interview with Sweet; Interview with Mhlahlo; Interview with Maxegwana. 
55  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 258.
234
SACTU underground operatives within the country on the working-class struggle 
and its relationship with the struggle for freedom. The long-term objective was 
to offer these lectures to South African trade unionists and workers in general. 
The NEC meeting stressed the urgent need to coordinate all SACTU activities 
so that very clear direction and guidance could be provided to cadres operating 
on the ground within the country. At first Janet Love was put in charge of the 
Education Department. However, in September 1983, the management commit-
tee of SACTU met and decided that a separate committee, the SACTU Education 
Committee (SEC), should be solely responsible for the education programme. 
The January 1984 NEC meeting rectified this decision and Janet Love, Ray 
Simons and someone who is only identified as MS were appointed to the com-
mittee. The SEC held its first meeting on 22 July 1984 and Mark Shope was 
elected its chair.56 SACTU mandated SEC to work with the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) to further its work. Aaron (Pemba) and Simon (Makhetha) 
were also assigned to the SEC. 
The SEC became one of the most active SACTU committees between 
August 1984 and March 1990. It offered a series of lectures which Mark Shope, 
Eric Mtshali (alias Jack Sambo or Eric Cengwa), Makhosazana Msimang, 
Mzukisi Skweyiya and others presented to various groups of South African 
workers and trade unionists in Lusaka, Harare and Nairobi.57 The trade unionists 
and workers that were targeted were in sectors in which SACTU wanted to con-
solidate its influence at first, and the sectors in which it wished to establish some 
foothold. The first two lectures in the series took place in Harare in Zimbabwe 
from 25 August to 4 September 1984.58 
Whilst nowhere near the scale of the SEC activities in the Frontline States, 
training programmes for trade union delegates who visited London and the 
Netherlands also took place. SACTU members, who conducted these seminars, 
used similar materials to those used in the Frontline States. Seminars were usu-
ally conducted at night after the ʻformal trade union education classes  ʼwith their 
sister unions were over for the day. Usually these would start around 20h00 or 
21h00 and go on until 02h00 or 03h00 in the morning. Seminars were conducted 
night after night, and at times over the weekends, and the venues ranged from 
houses in London to trade union facilities. A network of TUC affiliates would 
inform SACTU of the next visit and the ʻnight classes  ʼ would be arranged. 
Lecturers who ran these seminars were SACTU NEC members either from 
Lusaka or those based in London such as Xolile Majeke and Mark Sweet.59 These 
seminars and workshops further cemented the relationship between SACTU 
and the internally based trade unions, especially the COSATU affiliates after 
November 1985.     
56  SADET, MWS Papers, Letter from Janet Love to Mark Shope, 23 July 1984. 
57  SADET, MWS Papers, SACTU seminar lectures, 1984 to 1990.  
58  Attendance register at the ZCTU/ILO Seminar for South African Trade Unionists, Harare, 25 August to 4 September 
1984. 
59 Telephonic conversation between Jabulani Sithole and Mark Sweet, 10 November 2009; and Sithole, ʻThe South African 
Congress of Trade Unionsʼ: chapter 18.
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SACTU and trade union unity
Legassick has accused us of over-inflating the role which SACTU played in forg-
ing working class unity in South Africa.60 However, evidence we obtained from 
the Simons Collection at the University of Cape Town, the Directorʼs Office of 
the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College and the Lusaka Mission Papers at the 
University of Fort Hare confirms our view that SACTU was fully behind trade 
union unity. In a number of position papers on trade union unity which SACTU 
produced from 1980 onwards, there is constant reference to why working class 
unity was cardinal in the building of a strong workers  ʼmovement in South Africa. 
Prior to this, Mark Shopeʼs overtures to Barney Dladla, Harriet Bolton and Halton 
Cheadle in January 1974 are an indication of SACTUʼs willingness to extend a 
hand of friendship to the emerging trade unions and to forge unity of purpose 
and action. In his letter to Barney Dladla he said: ʻI cannot help expressing my 
appreciation of what you, Mrs Bolton, Halton Cheadle and others are doing for 
the struggle of African workers. I am very highly impressed indeed.ʼ61 One can-
not deny that tempers flared up and inflammatory statements were issued which 
offended the independent unions. But it is preposterous to attempt to apportion all 
blame to SACTU, as Legassick does.62 
SACTU followed the proceedings and developments at the union unity sum-
mits very closely ʻnot as observers, but as participants in its own right  ʼthrough-
out the first half of the 1980s. Its underground operatives, Sydney Mufamadi, 
Matthew Oliphant, Thobile Mhlahlo, Themba Nxumalo, Samuel Bhekuyise 
Kikine, Samson Ndou and many others, participated directly in each of the unity 
summits from Langa, Cape Town, in August 1981 to Athlone, Cape Town, in 
April 1983, and in most of the Feasibility Committee meetings from 1983 to 
1985. Contrary to Legassickʼs claim that these labour representatives played 
divisive and disruptive roles,63 they maintain that they were contesting ideologi-
cal positions which sought to mobilise the labour movement in opposition to the 
liberation movement through subtle attempts to dismiss the linkages between 
the class and the national questions in apartheid South Africa.64 There is ample 
evidence to show that the SACTU leadership consistently encouraged its under-
ground operatives not only to infiltrate the existing mainstream trade unions but 
to go out of their way to encourage workers to join them in large numbers so that 
they could reorientate them from their anti-liberation movement stance towards a 
more accommodating position.65 
60  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 259-261.
61  MWS Papers, Mark Shope to Barney Dladla, 28 January 1974, 1 and 4; and Sithole and Ndlovu, ʻ The Revival of the Labour 
Movementʼ: 219. 
62  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 242 and 261.
63  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 259-261.
64  Interview with Thobile Mhlahlo; Interview with Matthew Oliphant and Interview with Sam Kikine. 
65  UFH, ANC Lusaka, Box 120, Folder 169, SACTUʼs Position on Trade Union Unity Talks, 11 December 1984, 1; Interview 
with Thobile Mhlahlo; Interview with Matthew Oliphant. See also S. Ndlovu and J. Sithole, ʻ Trade union unity summits and 
the formation of COSATU, 1980–1990ʼ, SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 4: 1980-1990: chapter 
19. 
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SACTU persuaded its operatives to persevere and remain an integral part 
of the summits and Feasibility Committee meetings, especially when there were 
numerous incidents of mistrust between the FOSATU unions and the trade unions 
which had affiliated to the United Democratic Front after August 1983.66 It was 
even willing to discipline the front unions. As I mentioned earlier, Ray Simons 
had criticised general unionism.67 She felt that it placed more power and influ-
ence in the hands of the officials when compared with industrial unions, which 
guaranteed ʻabsolute  ʼ worker control, and that these unions were consequently 
thinly spread on the ground as they struggled to attract a sufficient number of 
workers to reconstitute themselves as industrial unions.68 
Furthermore, SACTU lauded the formation of the Feasibility Committee 
and urged all democratic trade unions to unite behind it and give it all the co-
operation it required. It stressed the need to observe neutrality and ensure that 
international affiliation was not an obstacle to unity as it would be the responsi-
bility of the members of the envisaged federation to ensure that it did not affiliate 
to ʻimperialist  ʼ trade union centres. It urged participating trade unions to focus 
on issues which united them rather than those which divided them, and insisted 
that the principle of unity in action under the slogan ʻan injury to one is an 
injury to all  ʼ should serve as the basis of their discussions.69 In early December 
1984 SACTU cautioned the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers  ʼ Union 
(CCAWUSA), the Cape Town Municipal Workers Association (CTMWA), the 
Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), the Food and Canning Workers  ʼ
Union (FCWU), FOSATU and the General Workers  ʼ Union (GWU) not to go 
ahead with the formation of the new federation without the general workers  ʼ
unions, which had been forced to accept observer status despite their protests 
that they had not secured a mandate to sit as observers at the Johannesburg meet-
ing on 3-4 March 1984.70 SACTU took away the responsibility to facilitate the 
creation of industrial unions from the general unions and put it on the shoulders 
of the Feasibility Committee. Here again Legassick has distorted reasons for the 
tensions at the unity talks in 1983 and 198471 in order to drive home his partisan 
view which apportions blame to anything that is associated with SACTU. 
SACTU played a role in facilitating trade union unity in sectors such as post 
and telecommunications and education, among others, during the second half of 
the 1980s. It worked with COSATU to facilitate a seminar to discuss ʻteacher 
unity  ʼ in April 1988. The outcome of this initiative was the seminar for thirty 
teacher representatives which SACTU, AATO and WCOTP hosted in Harare in 
66  R. Roux, ʻSACTU: An End of an Eraʼ, SALB, 14, 8, 1990: 48-9.
67  For more on this, see J. Foster, ʻThe Workers  ʼStruggle: Where Does FOSATU Stand?  ʼin J. Maree, ed., The Independent 
Trade Unions: 1974-1984 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987): 235. See also SALB, 7, 8, July 1982: 67-86; and Ndlovu and 
Sithole, ʻTrade union unity summitsʼ: chapter 19. 
68  BC1081, 4.4.15.6, Ray Simonsʼs notes made at a meeting with an underground operative identiﬁed as ʻPʼ, 2 June 1981; see 
also interviews with Ndlovu and Kikine.
69  UFH, ANC Archives, ANC Lusaka, Box 120, Folder 169, SACTUʼs Position on Trade Union Unity Talks, 11 December 
1984: 2-4; and UFH, ANC Lusaka, Box 135, Box 290, ʻSACTU Position Paper on Trade Union Unity, February 1985ʼ: 
3-4. 
70  UFH, ANC Archives, ANC Lusaka, Box 120, Folder 169, SACTUʼs Position on Trade Union Unity Talks, 11 December 
1984: 1–2.
71  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 260.
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Zimbabwe from 4 to 8 April 1988.72 The Harare seminar expedited the process 
which culminated in the launch of the South African Democratic Teachers  ʼUnion 
(SADTU) in Johannesburg on 6 October 1990.
In August 1989 SACTU warned the members and allies of CCAWUSA 
that ʻdivisions and splits served only the interests of the enemies of the work-
ing class  ʼand that their task was to stave off all divisions and disunity because 
unity was the major weapon of the working class. It urged them to rally 
around COSATU in its endeavours to forge unity within the trade union move-
ment and that HARWU and the Liquor and Catering Workers  ʼUnion should 
solidify their forces and membership in CCAWUSA and help build a strong 
united national catering and commercial sector.73 SACTU and COSATU had 
already formalised their working relationship.74
Ideological bullying and contestations over knowledge production 
Legassick makes his readers wait until the very end before they know his real 
motives for launching his vicious attack on us. He asserts that we are under pres-
sure to be ʻorganic intellectuals  ʼ for the ANC leadership of the 2000s which he 
describes as ʻan ANC leadership which has compromised with capitalism, which 
has promoted the rich and neglected the poorʼ. He adds that ʻas such they hate 
and fear any expression of the political independence of the working class which 
began to manifest itself in the struggles of the 1970s and 1980s. Hence their 
opposition to the democratic trade unions of that time.ʼ75 He then concludes:  
What is reflected in a small way in the debate over this chapter is 
the much bigger class struggle now taking place within the Tripartite 
Alliance between the ANC leadership on the one hand and the working 
class organised in COSATU on the other (with the SACP increasingly 
divided and caught between them). There is much to be learnt from the 
history of the struggle for liberation which remains relevant today.76   
These statements confirm the views I had on the matter the very first time 
Legassick expressed his hostile attitudes and feelings towards Ndlovu and 
myself. I strongly felt back then, and I still feel now, that he dragged us into 
his fights with Magubane as a mere sideshow. He seems to have regarded us as 
ʻstraw men  ʼwhom he could attack in order to advance an ideological standpoint 
which has long been very hostile to the leadership of the SACTU, ANC and the 
SACP. 
72  SADET, MWS Papers, Speech by Mark Shope, ʻPolitical Report of the South African Congress of Trade Unions to the 
14th Statutory Conference of International Federation of Teachers (FISE) and the World Teachers  ʼConference, Prague, 
Czechoslovakia, 2-7 September 1989: 1-2. UFH, ANC SOMAFCO, Directorʼs Ofﬁce, Box 54, Folder 10, Report of the 
Seminar on Teacher Unity in South Africa held at Kentucky Hotel, Harare, 4-8 April 1988; Interview with Mtshali. 
73  UFH, ANC Sweden Mission, Box 8, Folder 57, SACTU Message to Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union (HARWU), 
Liquor & Catering Trades Employees  ʼUnion: 1.
74  Sithole, ʻThe South African Congress of Trade Unionsʼ: chapter 18.
75  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 266.
76  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 266.
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Legassick accused Magubane, Ndlovu and me of failing to understand the 
position of the Marxist Workers Tendency (MWT) of the ANC. He adds that the 
national democratic revolution can be consummated only by the working class 
taking power.77 He denies that the MWT of the ANC rejected the notion of colo-
nialism of a special type (CST), as we had maintained. He says it rejected the 
idea which the SACP deduced from it that ʻnational democratic revolution was a 
required stage preceding the proletarian, socialist revolutionʼ. Although I hold no 
brief for the SACP, I often wonder whether the notion of a two-stage theory had 
its origins from within its ranks or whether it was an external imposition.
Despite his vehement denials that he is hostile to the national question, the 
CST and the ANC leadership in particular, his present and past writings confirm 
our charges that he has always been hostile to the CST. In the recent article he 
claims that ʻthe essential reason that Magubane et al., on behalf of the presiden-
tial project, found it necessary to contest the Hemson et al. chapter was because 
this chapter raised the issues of political independence of the working class from 
nationalist orthodoxyʼ.78 In 1974, for example, he dismissed the characterisa-
tion of South Africa as a case of ʻinternal colonialism  ʼas vague, inconsistent and 
unsatisfactory in explaining the origins, functions and dynamics of its twenti-
eth-century society.79 While Legassick acknowledges that the ANC is the oldest 
organisation with majority support in South Africa, he has consistently denigrated 
its leadership, which he accuses of counter-revolutionary politics.80 He draws a 
sharp distinction between the ANC and SACP leadership, on the one hand; and 
the black urban and rural masses, the youth and the working class, on the other. 
The latter are identified as the only motive forces which were, and still are, capa-
ble of leading the struggle for revolutionary change.81 In keeping with its policy 
of entryism, the MWT of the ANC has spent its entire existence infiltrating the 
ANC and COSATU with the aim of winning over the general membership and 
then turning it against the leadership of these organisations. 
Legassickʼs views were echoed by and elaborated upon in the works of 
various, predominantly white academics.82 Some of them levelled the same 
accusations which Legassick is now directing at us, against SACTU, the ANC 
and SACP. They accused the three alliance partners of ignoring the criticism of 
their continued use of ʻinternal colonialism  ʼ to analyse particular social polari-
ties of South Africa. They added that fundamentally, ʻinternal colonialism  ʼfailed 
to come to grips with the central arguments of the revisionist scholarship of the 
1970s which eloquently and powerfully demonstrated that South African indus-
77  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 263. 78  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼ
movementʼ: 241.
79  M. Legassick, ʻSouth Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violenceʼ, Economy and Society, 3, 3 (1974): 255. 
80  M. Legassick, ʻ The Past and Present Role of the Marxist Workerist Tendency of the ANC in the Liberation struggle in South 
Africaʼ, in I. Liebenberg et al., eds., The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Pretoria: 
HAUM, 1994): 173, 180-1.
81  Legassick, ʻThe Past and Present Roleʼ: 175-6; M. Legassick, Towards Socialist Democracy (Pietermaritzburg: University 
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trialisation and the creation of class society followed classic capitalist lines.83 
Others rejected the view that during apartheid, the national and class struggles 
were intertwined. The denial of these linkages was underpinned by a strong ʻanti-
nationalist current  ʼwhich dismissed the national liberation struggle as ʻpopulist 
and nationalist  ʼ in character and therefore antithetical to socialism.84 Proponents 
of this view not only questioned the role and genuineness of the non-proletarian 
forces in the liberation struggle, but dismissed the quest for national liberation by 
the vast majority of the masses of the people of South Africa as just an aberration 
in a struggle for socialism. They felt that ʻpopulism and nationalism  ʼ stood in 
absolute contradiction to working class politics.85  
Attempts to downplay the national question gained momentum soon after 
the formation of the Tripartite Alliance in the early 1990s. Workerists within 
COSATU and other Trotskyite tendencies outside it dismissed the alliance as a 
sacrifice of working class interests on the altar of political expediency. Some pro-
tested that workers did not exercise control over the ANC and were thus unable 
to influence it politically. Others dismissed the ANC as a body of unrepentant 
nationalists and the SACP as Stalinists who were bound to feed on the work-
ing class.86 There were numerous calls for the formation of a workers  ʼparty led 
by COSATU which would present a political and ideological alternative to the 
ANC–SACP alliance. Were these calls a Freudian slip on the part of workerists 
and Trotskyites who had always intended to establish the labour movement as 
a force in opposition to the liberation movement after the attainment of ʻpoliti-
cal  ʼ freedom? Were the beginnings of student-linked trade unionism and its 
workerist tendencies shortly after the 1968 uprisings in Czechoslovakia coin-
cidental or were they instructive in hatching out possible future responses to a 
liberated South Africa? Surely these questions beg some answers in the light of 
the workerist hostility to the rise of the Tripartite Alliance in the early 1990s and 
Legassickʼs views in response to our chapter in particular and the SADET project 
in general. 
Legassick has implied that Magubane, Sifiso Ndlovu and I ganged up 
against him and dismissed his arguments, evidence and interpretations about a 
period he was involved in as an activist during the production of volume two 
of the SADET project. He has repeatedly suggested that we inflated the role 
of SACTU to the detriment of the independent unions. I strongly deny that we 
deflated the role of the independent unions. Highlighting the role of SACTU 
in the South African labour struggle is not the same as deflating the role of the 
independent unions. Legassick gives the impression that we falsified the history 
of SACTU and ignored all evidence and works of other historians of the labour 
83  Freund, ʻSome Unasked Questions on Politics: 119-20, 122. 
84  S. Friedman, ʻThe Struggle within the Struggle: South African Resistance Strategiesʼ, Transformation, 3, 1987: 66.  
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struggles. It is a complete fabrication to suggest that Ndlovu and I are hostile 
to the trade unions which were formed in the wake of the 1973 black workers  ʼ
strikes and that we participated in the suppression of his views at SADET.87 He 
should not assume that our general respect for his work as an historian entitles 
him to coerce us into accepting his perspective on the history of SACTU. That we 
differ with the revisionist interpretation of the history of SACTU does not mean 
we have ignored any evidence or the work of previous historians of trade unions.   
On the contrary, it is Legassick himself who is coercing us to embrace the 
revisionist interpretation of the history of SACTU. While I value the revisionist 
perspectives on the history of SACTU, I reserve the right to differ with them pri-
marily because I understand the ideological world outlook that has informed their 
line of thinking, and also because the archival and oral sources I have consulted 
have enabled me to present an alternative version of its history. I therefore refuse 
to embrace uncritically a version that is espoused by academic intellectuals who, 
for historical reasons just alluded to, have always considered themselves as hold-
ing the correct left line on the history of SACTU and yet they were never part 
of it. What I am willing to do is to capture and relate its history through the eyes 
and memories of ordinary working class activists who participated in the worker 
struggles out of necessity during the 1970s and 1980s. This does not mean I will 
shy away from legitimate criticism of its history.
Legassick ends his article with an arrogant reading of our quotation from 
Salman Rushdieʼs novel Shame. He concludes that ʻNdlovu and Sithole, however, 
can only be using the words as an epigraph for their chapter because they are cel-
ebrating the fact that “[H]istory loves only those who dominate her” – by which, 
presumably, they mean the ANC and SACTU!ʼ88 This is a complete misreading 
of the epigraph. It is not celebratory and it has nothing to do with SACTU and 
the ANC. Instead, it was Legassick himself who actually inspired the epigraph 
rather than the ANC. I had just finished re-reading Rushdieʼs Shame when he 
phoned me and tried once again to badger me into accepting his highly partial 
version of the history of SACTU. I turned to Rushdie and found this quotation, 
which I used to reflect on how established scholars often abuse their power to try 
to suppress versions of knowledge which contradict their ideological standpoint, 
while selectively promoting knowledge with which they ideologically and theo-
retically agree. There is no doubt in my mind that this is really what lies behind 
Legassickʼs noises about the contestation over the production of knowledge. 
Legassick presents himself and his mates as the only revolutionary intel-
lectuals and repositories of revolutionary theory and practice. Anyone who dif-
fers with them is dubbed a rightwing reactionary, unrepentant nationalist or a 
Stalinist who should be combated.89 I often wonder, though, whether they are 
not utopian socialists who are detracting from the Allianceʼs national democratic 
87  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 241, 249, 257, 265 and 266.
88  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 266.
89  Legassick, ʻDebating the revival of the workers  ʼmovementʼ: 265.
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revolution by trying to impose their own rigidly held theory as the only viable 
alternative. Although I hold no brief for the ANC, SACTU and the SACP, I sub-
scribe to the view that in apartheid South Africa the class and national struggles 
were intertwined like the many injustices they sought to redress.90 Clearly, the 
tale of SACTUʼs role and contributions to the South African labour struggles 
will remain controversial and highly contested, especially in an academic con-
text that remains overly dominated by highly partisan and intolerant commenta-
tors who demonise those who have the temerity to express views that differ from 
their own. 
90  For recent articulation of this position, see N Ramatlhodi, ʻOne revolution to solve many illsʼ, Sunday Times, 8 November 
2009. 
